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Proliferation Expert David Kay Takes on Iraq, Terrorism, and the CWC
David Kay is Assistant Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation, a private contractor in McLean, VA, where he works on proliferation and terrorism issues. Kay previously worked for the International Atomic Energy Agency for eight years, and led a team of nuclear weapons inspectors in Iraq after the Gulf War.
What is the current status of weapons inspections in Iraq?
Inspections have been going on for five years at the rate of some two or three inspections a month. The results continually come up that the Iraqis are hiding some weapons, that there's incomplete information being provided by the Iraqis and that there's a strong suspicion of continuing activity with regard to biological weapons and missiles in particular, but also with chemical and nuclear weapons production.
How do we deal with Iraq's continued violations of UN Security Resolution 687?
I say we keep the pressure on - continue to inspect and apply sanctions - knowing that the Iraqis are giving only grudging, limited cooperation. This is important not just for the United States but particularly for our European allies and others. The inspections have shown to the French and the Russians and others that an agreement of inspections that is being run fairly has found the Iraqis guilty of cheating. That helps tremendously in holding together coalition support for sanctions.
What is the status of weapons programs in the Middle East?
Iraq: nuclear program for over 10 years; chemical weapons program started during Iran-Iraq War produces the advanced nerve gas VX; chemical weapons tested on missile warheads; advanced biological weapons program produces agents such as anthrax and botulinum; filled 25 missile warheads with biological agents during the Gulf War.
Iran: nuclear program started under Shah not as advanced as Iraqi program; significant amounts of nerve gas probable; little known about biological weapons program; nuclear program under active development; attempts to buy nuclear expertise from former Soviet Union; missile capability assisted by North Korea and China.
Syria: chemical weapons program for 20 years as answer to Israeli nuclear capability; chemicals used as strategic weapons to deter attack on Damascus and ensure survival of the regime; little known about biological weapons program but easy to develop; small nuclear capability; acquired missiles from former Soviet Union and North Korea; no evidence of transference of chemical weapons to terrorists.
Libya: attempts to buy nuclear capacity for over 20 years; advanced nuclear research facility with small reactor purchased from Soviets; Germany and other European suppliers assisted chemical weapons program; limited missile capacity.
You have three states in the region that have chemical capacity and close links with terrorists: Iran, Syria and Libya. That is the bigger threat in the Middle East.
[For the last few years, Kay has studied the problem posed to U.S. foreign and military policy by terrorists.]
How has terrorism changed over the past 30 years?
For one, terrorism is a way of confronting the U.S without directly exposing oneself to military action. Secondly, technology has changed so that it is possible for very small groups of individuals to obtain the capacity to do tremendous damage. Some of those individuals are supported by states. But some are just groups of people that have messianic dreams and desires that are not tied to any sense of political reality. Another difference is that in the past, the Soviets wanted terrorist groups to embarrass the U.S. - to do damage to some of our allies - but they didn't want terrorist action to provoke a military strike against the Soviet Union. Today, state sponsors - and there is a broader band of states to be concerned with - are far less responsible. Also, funding is not a limitation for terrorist groups today.
How are governments dealing with terrorism?
Terrorism is one of the most frustrating issues for a government to deal with. You don't get much comfort out of your successes. No matter how good a country is at providing barriers to terrorists, at least a few will get through. The more the terrorist succeeds, the more political pressure you face to prevent these acts, the closer you are to taking steps that change the nature of civil liberties within your own society. There clearly are some technical steps with regard to policing and intelligence - airport security, prevention of passport forgery - but they by themselves will not do the job. Another step is to make sure the terrorist knows there is no safe haven. The problem today with terrorism is that there are safe havens - Libya, Syria, Iran - and we don't deal effectively with them.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an international treaty banning the manufacture, production and use of chemical weapons; controlling the sales of chemicals used to make them; and setting up a system of inspections to deter violations. The U.S. is a signatory but has yet to ratify the treaty because of reinvigorated effort by critics charging that the treaty will not only be useless but will be used to reduce American investment in chemical weapons intelligence acquisition and defenses. [See editorials on this subject in Security Affairs, June-August 1996 and November '95-January 1996.] President Clinton has renewed his drive to win Senate ratification of the treaty.]
Why has the Senate chosen not to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention?
The argument in the Senate is that the only nations that would sign it would be nations like ourselves. And it would be possible even under that convention to cheat and to produce at least small amounts of chemical weapons. Then there's the issue of whether or not you believe that the Chinese, the Russians and the Libyans would either sign it or comply with it. And if you don't believe that, then why should we ratify it. That's a powerful argument.
Is the Chemical Weapons Convention worth having?
The Convention is a good convention that should be ratified but there is the obvious problem of cheating that shouldn't be swept under the rug. The Convention stakes a moral position. When we catch the Libyans cheating under the Convention, for example, it shows our European allies that Libya is in fact a terrorist state. It's harder to do this when you don't have a Convention that makes that behavior illegal. The treaty is enforceable but there is no 100 percent guarantee of accuracy and verification. The convention will not ensure that no one cheats.
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