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The Qualitative Edge
The Qualitative Edge
(April-May 1994) Israel's ability to defend itself is predicated on its "qualitative military edge" over any likely combination of aggressors. Recent trends, however, indicate that at least some of the traditional components of the qualitative edge are deteriorating.
Israel's qualitative edge is comprised of three primary elements: a) better military equipment than its enemies, c) superior tactics, and c) better motivated, trained, and led troops. Unable to match its enemies in numbers or wealth, Israel has demonstrably maintained superiority in the quality of its personnel and equipment.
Today, the United States works with many countries that maintain a state of war with Israel. Due to their great wealth, these countries are able to purchase advanced U.S. weaponry in great quantities. There are even indications that decreased funding for U.S. military projects may lead to co-development of weapons systems with some of these countries. Extremely dangerous states (Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya), while constrained from legally receiving U.S. weapons or weapons- related technology, continue actively to seek advanced military systems including weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and the technology to enable them to produce their own unconventional weapons systems. This process is dramatically changing Israel's understanding of its own security situation. [Ed. note: see interview with Israeli diplomat Michael Shiloh on page 1.]
The U.S. permits Israel to spend more than $400 million of its American military aid each year on weapons development and production in Israel; the remaining $1.4 billion is spent in the U.S. on American systems. While a major component of the qualitative edge, the future of U.S. foreign assistance seems quite shaky. It is unclear how much will be available five or ten years from now. Also, inflation continues to eat away at the funds provided by the U.S., the total of which has remained static. From 1985 to 1993, U.S. military assistance to Israel lost 32 percent of its purchasing power.
America's much vaunted cooperation with Israel in developing combat doctrines and tactics has also decreased. Since the mid-1980s, the Israelis have understood that military tactics shared with the U.S. have, in some cases, been passed on to other Middle Eastern states. Consequently, Israel sometimes hesitates to share new information with the U.S., and by electing not to participate in certain war games and exercises, deprives itself and the U.S. of new tactics as well.
Today, more and more of Israel's historic adversaries teach their troops western combat tactics and participate to varying degrees in joint exercises with U.S. and other western troops. As a result, to an unknown degree, the superiority of Israel's combat tactics over those of its foes has decreased.
While American politicians of all stripes and parties tout the U.S. commitment to Israel's qualitative edge, specific steps must be taken to ensure its continuation and future growth. Such steps can include greater incentives for science and technology sharing in both the public and private sectors; an increase in both the scope and depth of intelligence and defense cooperation and sharing, including satellite data for early-warning and defenses against missiles and unconventional weapons; greater use of foreign military sales (FMS) funds in Israel to allow Israel to develop capabilities to meet its unique challenges, and; greater incentives for Israeli commercial growth and U.S.-Israel trade.
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