Three U.S. servicemen were killed during a maritime interdiction operation (MIO) that prevented devastating strikes against two major offshore Iraqi oil terminals in the Persian Gulf on April 24, 2004. The dead included two U.S. Navy sailors and one U.S. Coast Guardsman. Four other U.S. Navy personnel were injured in the attack. The attempts on the al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) and the Khor Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) off southern Iraq highlight the increasing focus on maritime targets by terrorists.

At approximately 5:00 pm local time, coalition naval forces observed an unidentified dhow - a traditional sailboat used extensively throughout the Middle East for transporting goods - approaching the Khor Al Amaya Oil Terminal. A Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure Team (VBSS) team was immediately launched from the USS Firebolt (PC-10) - a Cyclone-class coastal patrol boat - to intercept the unidentified vessel. As the seven-man VBSS team attempted to board the dhow, it was sundered by an enormous explosion.

Approximately 20 minutes later, two speedboats were observed racing towards the al Basra oil terminal. Security forces stationed at the ABOT facility reportedly opened fire on the craft triggering violent explosions within meters of the oil platform and two supertankers - known in the industry as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) - the Takasuza, which was loaded to capacity with 280,000 tons of crude oil, and the empty Apollo. A successful attack on the Takasuza would have crippled the ABOT facility while a sunken Apollo would have shut down the offshore loading platform for months as salvage crews worked to recover the vessel. Approximately 90 percent of Iraq’s oil exports are loaded onto waiting ships via the offshore ABOT and KAAOT oil terminals. Damage to the terminal was limited to an electrical generator.

Both terminals were temporarily shut down for a 24-hour period due to heightened security concerns at a cost of $28 million in lost oil revenue. Iraq’s economy is almost entirely dependent on the two offshore facilities. A successful strike, resulting in the sinking or setting ablaze of one or two of the tankers at the ABOT facility during the attack or heavy damage to either offshore platform, would have brought Iraq’s delicate economy to a standstill for months with serious consequences for global oil prices.

The attacks were attributed to al Qaeda after a statement signed by al Qaeda-operative Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi appeared on the Muntada al-Ansar Islamist website, according to a joint Reuters and Associated Press report dated April 26, 2004. “We give you good tidings...your brothers with their boats target[ing] oil tankers. Let the whole world hear this: We have brought you a people who love death just as you love life... and there will be many more attacks and operations, God willing.”

Since the attack, the U.S. Navy has enforced a two-tiered security zone surrounding both the KAAOT and ABOT facilities. Comprised of an outer zone and an inner exclusion zone. Ships entering the outer warning zone - extending 1.87 miles from the terminals - must identify their name, destination, and cargo of their vessel. The right of free passage, however, has been suspended within the inner zone, which extends 1.25 miles from both terminals in all directions. No vessels are authorized to enter the inner exclusion zone unless they are pre-approved to use the offshore oil facilities.

The Navy has also warned all vessels outside the exclusion zone to steer clear of coalition security forces and to fully cooperate with their requests. Ships failing to do so will be designated hostile, under which condition the use of deadly force is authorized. Furthermore, no attempts will be made by coalition naval forces to board unauthorized ships operating within the exclusion zone, naval officials warned. Unidentified ships within the inner perimeter will be engaged by coalition forces and sunk.

In addition, the Navy announced that it is working more closely with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to enhance the security of their offshore oil terminals. Kuwait has four offshore oil facilities: Mina Shuaiba, Mina Abdullah, Mina Saud, and Mina al-Ahmadi. Saudi Arabia hosts the largest offshore oil terminal, Ras Tanura, in the Red Sea.

Escalation in Maritime Terrorism in the Gulf
Despite the increased presence of coalition naval forces in the Persian Gulf, the region has experienced a rise in seaborne terrorism over the last year. In addition to the two attacks on Iraq’s offshore oil facilities, Iranian officials reported four explosive-laden speedboats entered Iranian waters - in what could have been a precursor to the attacks on the ABOT and KAAOT oil-loading facilities - in March 2003. The Iranian Navy was able to destroy one of the speedboats but no other details have been released, according to Fairplay International Shipping Weekly, March 28, 2003. The Worldwide Threat to Shipping Mariner Warning Information Center, located at the Office of U.S. Naval Intelligence Civil Maritime Analysis Department, reported two additional attacks involving Iranian maritime forces earlier this year.

Iraqi pirates attacked the Iranian container ship Hormuz-24 while it was en route from Dubai to the Port of Khorramshahr, Iran on April 16, 2004. One crewman was injured by gunfire in the attack but according to the Mariner Warning Information Center, Iranian Coast Guard personal successfully prevented the attackers from stopping and boarding the ship. Two days later, the Iranian passenger ferry Negin came under attack from a pirate-launched rocket-propelled grenade near the Arvandkenar waterway while en route to Khorramshahr, according to Fairplay, April 29, 2004. The Negin reportedly sustained heavy damage during the attack. Iraqi pirates boarded the ship and robbed the over 100 Kuwaiti and Iranian passengers and attempted to ransom their release. Iranian officials have offered no additional information regarding the fate of the passengers.

Blaming the instability in Iraq for the rise of seaborne terrorism in the Gulf region, Iranian officials have increased maritime security in and around the Iranian port of Khorramshahr. Meanwhile, maritime-related terrorism continues to trouble other nations - specifically foreigners.

A remotely detonated car bomb killed three Chinese engineers and seriously injured 12 others, including 10 Chinese nationals, on May 3, 2004 while en route to a construction site for the new deep water port facility in Gwadar, Pakistan, according to Fairplay, May 5, 2004. The Chinese government has refused to abandon the project citing strong relationships between the two countries. Pakistani authorities have arrested two suspects in the case.

Kuwait placed its seaports on heightened alert after receiving intelligence from U.S. and British authorities indicating a similar attack against foreigners, like those that had occurred in Pakistan, was imminent, Shipping News, an online maritime news website, reported May 12, 2004. Kuwaiti Customs Chief Ibrahim Al Ghanem said almost every boat entering Kuwaiti waters was searched for terrorists. After the most recent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti oil-related facilities were again placed on high alert.

South Korean officials ordered increased port security between April 23 and April 30 at the request of South Korea’s intelligence service, Business Times of Singapore, reported on April 23, 2004. The National Intelligence Service reported a letter from the previously unheard of “Yellow-Red Overseas Organization” was received in the South Korean embassy in Bangkok, reported the Business Times. The letter threatened to attack port facilities in Australia, Japan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines.

U.S. Boosts Foreign Naval Capabilities to Combat Piracy and Terrorism
In a U.S.-led effort to boost coastal surveillance and maritime interdiction capabilities of Middle Eastern countries ravaged by terrorism and piracy, both Iraq and Yemen have received coastal patrol craft from the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard.

Eight formerly decommissioned Coast Guard (USCG) 44-foot Motor Life Boats, were transferred to the Yemeni Coast Guard Authority (YCGA) in April 2004. The newly refitted boats are designed to provide a foundation for Yemen’s new coastal defense and anti-terrorism capabilities. A training program between the U.S. and Yemeni Coast Guard was established in 2002 with the creation of the YCGA, MarineLog.com reported, April 14, 2004.

The online maritime news service also reported on May 6, 2004 that the newly created Iraqi Coastal Defense Force (ICDF) received two Chinese-built, 27-meter patrol craft earlier this month. Originally procured in 2002 under the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food program, both boats were prevented from entering Iraq because of their dual-use military capabilities. The United States subsequently purchased the two boats, designated patrol craft 102 and 103, and kept them in storage in Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates for the last two years.

ICDF training began in January 2004 with 214 volunteers attending a three-month boot camp culminating in a technical training program at a newly constructed training facility in Umm Qasr, according to MarineLog.com. The training program is designed for anti-smuggling and harbor-coastal defense operations within the territorial waters of Iraq. Current goals include autonomous daylight operations for the ICDF by June 1 and nighttime operations by September 30.

Malaysia and Indonesia Refuse U.S. Request to Patrol Malacca Straits
While some nations are eager to improve relations with the United States on issues of maritime security, others have been less receptive. Government officials from both Indonesia and Malaysia have recently warned the United States not to patrol the Malacca Straits despite rampant piracy in the economically critical waterway and the sorry state of both the Indonesian and Malaysian naval forces. A quarter of the world’s commerce and half of the world’s oil supply travels through the Straits of Malacca.

When asked how to combat the “increasing synergy between piracy and terrorism” within the Malacca Straits during a March 31 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, head of U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Thomas Fargo suggested increasing cooperation among regional nations and introducing a U.S. naval presence in the Malacca Straits under the proposed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI).

While some security threats may not require cooperative international action, “some [security threats] will challenge the resources of any nation. So, national policies that permit cooperation against threats must be established,” including possibly placing “[U.S.] special operations forces on high-speed vessels, putting [U.S.] Marines on high-speed vessels so that we [U.S.] can use boats that might be incorporated with these vessels to conduct effective interdiction,” Fargo told Congress. A month later in Victoria, British Columbia, Fargo said the RMSI is designed to “develop a partnership of the willing regional (Southeast Asia) nations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws.”

Fargo concluded his speech on military operations and law enforcement by distinguishing between the already-implemented Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the RMSI “the PSI is a global effort to stem the proliferation, by any means, of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. RMSI, on the other hand, will be focused on maritime transnational threats in the Asia-Pacific region.” Moreover, “the ultimate decision to share information or to act against a threat remains a voluntary and sovereign decision...and finally, activities under RMSI will be undertaken under existing international and domestic law.”

Despite support for the initiative from Singapore, Fargo’s comments quickly drew sharp criticism from Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak and Indonesian officials, who both refused to permit U.S. military forces to operate in the heavily trafficked waterway. The Straits of Malacca fall exclusively within Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian territorial waters. According to Channelnewsasia.com, an online news service, April 4, 2004, Razak said: “In principle, ensuring security in the Straits of Malacca is the responsibility of Malaysia and Indonesia, and for the present, we do not propose to invite the United States to join the security operations we have mounted there.”

Razak emphasized increased counter-terrorism training between the three states. “It is our responsibility to convince the international community that the straits will not be exposed to possibilities’ of a terror attack,” he said, according to the Business Times, June 14, 2004. He concluded, however, by ruling out a U.S. naval presence. “The presence of foreign troops in our waters would trigger public anger and breathe new life in the terrorist groups...we will not budge from our position that the Straits of Malacca are our sovereign territory.”

Addressing the Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures and Diving Exercises 2004, held in late April 2004, Singapore’s Defense Minister, Teo Chee Hean, broke ranks with Malaysia and Indonesia over the issue if U.S. joint patrols. “The primary responsibility for the safety and security of the Malacca Straits lies with the three littoral states [Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore]. However, what is in place today is not adequate...no single state has the resources to deal effectively with this threat. Moreover, the full effects of maritime terrorism extend far beyond the littorals... other [nations] have a strong economic, if not strategic, interest in ensuring that the Malacca Straits is kept open and safe.” The Indonesian navy has some 20 patrol boats to guard an archipelago of 17,000 islands. Furthermore, Indonesia forbids Malaysia and Singapore to pursue fleeing terrorists or pirates into Indonesian waters, according to the Economist, June 10, 2004. When information regarding a hot pursuit is passed to the Indonesian government, it disappears into a hole, Singaporean navy officials said.

Some analysts attribute the initial rejection of U.S. naval power in the Malacca Straits to a diplomatic failure. “By announcing its [U.S.] intentions before gaining the approval and support of countries (specifically Indonesia and Malaysia) directly affected [by the RMSI]... the United States may have put the proverbial cart before the horse, Stratfor.com, the online think-tank, reported April 5, 2004.

At the same time, according to the Business Times, April 23, 2004, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Matthew Daley, speaking in Singapore, warned that the U.S. intelligence community believes the financial hubs and critical shipping lanes - including the Straits of Malacca and the Singapore Straits of Asia - are likely targets for a new round of terrorist strikes. “We have begun to focus on the potential of a disastrous maritime terrorist incident ... we believe it essential to work with the countries of the region to rapidly improve maritime security ... we have good reason to believe terrorists will increasingly turn to the most unregulated of spaces - the sea.” FBI Director Robert Mueller voiced similar warnings while speaking in Hong Kong during the same timeframe. Eight different maritime attacks or attempted attacks were reported off of Indonesia’s coast between April 20 and April 26 alone.

U.S. Threatens to Refuse Entry Into U.S. Waters for ISPS Non-Compliance

Port security remains a major concern for the United States and the international community as the July 1, 2004 deadline for the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) approaches. The ISPS, initiated by the UN’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) in January 2002, aims to enhance security at port facilities and the maritime shipping industry in conjunction with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI).

The United States has scored a major diplomatic achievement in that both Panama and Liberia have consented to U.S. requests to allow member nations of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict ships suspected of carrying illicit cargoes - including weapons of mass destruction or related materials in international waters. Panama and Liberia represent the two largest registries for ships sailing under flags of convenience. Over half the world’s shipping industry sails under the infamous flag of convenience clause because foreign countries often enforce weaker and vastly cheaper safety regulations. Most ships thought to be operated or owned by al Qaeda sail under Liberian or Panamanian flags, according to a Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, June 8, 2004.

In addition, starting this summer, the U.S. Coast Guard plans on sending International Port Security Liaison Officers (IPSLO) to approximately 45 different foreign ports per year to evaluate the compliance and implementation of ISPS protocols. “By helping other nations evaluate security measures in their ports, we can help to ensure the safety and security of the global maritime transportation system,” Adm. Thomas H. Collins, commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, announced in an April 16, 2004 Coast Guard press release.

With less than three weeks to the ISPS deadline, however, three quarters of the world’s shipping fleet and 90 percent of the world’s port facilities have yet to be certified as ISPS-compliant, according to figures released by the IMO on June 11, 2004. Only 22.7 percent of vessels and only 10.7 percent of maritime facilities have been successfully certified as ISPS-compliant. Seventy-seven percent of vessels and 84 percent of port facilities have submitted ISPS and are awaiting ISPS approval.

IMO secretary-general Efthimios Mitropoulos praised, “the continuing efforts by governments and industry to ensure that the regulatory regime adopted by IMO in December 2002 is in place by the set deadline of 1 July 2004,” but cautioned other nations to, “redouble their efforts to implement the new security measures as soon as possible.” The Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) of Singapore has already warned that ships entering the port giving false information regarding ISPS-certification will be subjected to heavy fines and/or imprisonment. In a shipping community circular, the MPA said ships entering the port of Singapore should be prepared to show a valid International Ship Security Certificate along with the issuing authority and answer questions regarding the current security level the ship is operating at and what level of security the ship was operating at for its last 10 port calls, according to the Business Times, June 14, 2004.

Meanwhile, many smaller nations have expressed concerns that they have neither the manpower nor the financial ability to comply with the strict new ISPS mandate. New Zealand and Australia have both announced emergency funding for some 11 Pacific nations including Papua New Guinea and Fiji to replace antiquated docks and boost cargo-screening capabilities to combat the terrorist threat.

“The traditional image of the South Pacific has long been one of a tropical paradise ... but as experience has shown in Kenya and Tanzania, where hundreds of locals were killed in terrorists attacks on U.S. embassies, remoteness, peacefulness, and even neutrality or non-alignment do not guarantee security from terrorists,” New Zealand’s Prime Minister Helen Clark warned during the opening ceremonies of the Pacific Round Table on Counter-Terrorism in Wellington, according to The Australian, May 11, 2004. Recognizing the economic impact non-ISPS compliance can burden certain port facilities with, Singapore offered a five percent rebate on port dues between May 1 and June 30 for ships that meet ISPS compliance before the July 1 deadline, MarineLog.com, reported April 30, 2004.

European leaders have repeatedly assured the United States that many - if not all - port facilities in the European Union will meet the July 1 deadline. “Our port (Hamburg), and the many other water traffic entries to the European continent, have been taking measures for the maintenance and tightening up of security based on the implementation of internationally binding regulations for the prevention of terrorist attacks on ships and port facilities,” Jurgen Sorgenfrei, chairman of the Port of Hamburg Marketing Association, pledged to reporters at the National Press Club in Washington D.C., Schednet.com, an online maritime service, reported April 14, 2004.

Vessels wishing to make port calls in the United States but have visited foreign ports that are not ISPS-compliant may not be allowed to enter U.S. waters, the United States Coast Guard warned in an April 16, 2004 press release. According to the USCG statement, ships that have berthed at non-ISPS compliant ports will be subject to additional security measures including at-sea boarding’s by USCG interdiction teams prior to entry into U.S. port facilities, controlling the vessel’s movement via armed maritime escorts, conducting comprehensive security inspections at sea or dock, or denying the vessels entry into U.S. territorial waters. Some proposed regulations call for the last 10 ports visited by a ship to be ISPS-compliant in order for that ship to enter U.S. territorial waters.

The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the European Union recently signed an agreement expanding the existing Customs and Border Protection’s Container Initiative throughout the European Community. The enforced agreement seeks to intensify and broaden Customs cooperation, expand the container Security Initiative, establish of minimum standards for risk-management techniques, and improve public and private partnerships for securing the logistics chain for international trade between the European Union and the United States, the World Wide Shipper reported, April 26, 2004.

Foreign Crews Quietly Investigated for Terror Ties
The United States intelligence community has quietly initiated two simultaneous pilot programs to investigate and track international crews of ships manning vessels bound for U.S. waters, according to Fairplay, April 15, 2004.

One program is under the stewardship of the Miami-based Manning Agency Screening Initiative while another, more comprehensive project, is being erected under the 21-country Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation program (APEC). Both systems are designed to track and monitor international seafarer’s through manning agencies with a specific focus on Southeast Asian crews.

International manning agencies, however, have not totally embraced the idea citing increased expenses and time-consuming background investigations beyond their own country’s regulatory requirements. “... It sounds like this is the U.S. government getting into the domestic affairs of another country. Not that I would ever criticize my government for protecting us against terrorist threats, but I can see some complications from the perspective of international law,” the International Council of Cruise Lines’ Michael Crye told Fairplay. In the same article, Captain Pradeep Chawla, director for the quality assurance and training at the Hong Kong-based ship manager Anglo Eastern added, “the security should be more at the government level than at the manning level... the burden on the manning agency should be only to check a national database... many agents don’t have the money or the staff to do these checks, so to expect them is not fair or reasonable.” Muslim-dominated countries are already reporting difficulty in finding employment opportunities in the sea-faring industry because of new, restrictive visa requirements for ships making port calls in the United States in a post-September 11 world.

Despite the voiced concerns of the manning industry, U.S. intelligence agencies are continuing to develop the tracking database, which is expected to contain 900 companies representing approximately 70-80 percent of the ship manning industry located throughout the Asia Pacific, according to Fairplay.

Foreign Ports Seize Weapons En Route to U.S., Egypt.
Italian customs officials in the port of Gioia Tauro seized approximately 8,000 assault rifles and automatic weapons from three cargo containers on board a ship traveling from Romania to New York on April 10, 2004. According to the ships manifest, the containers were identified as transporting “common guns,” not the $6 million worth of combat weapons found by Italian port officials.

The rifles were designated as military weapons because they were equipped with bayonets and ammunition cartridges that hold up to 30 rounds. Italian officials have said the munitions were en route to an unidentified gun company in the state of Georgia. Although it is legal to ship certain weapons overseas, assault weapons of this caliber are banned by international law under most circumstances. No further information is available pending an investigation.

Turkish customs officials announced the interception of a radio-controlled missile, launcher and other weapon systems - including a number of rockets and warheads - from a ship bound for Egypt from the Ukraine, the Associated Press reported June 3, 2004. The weapons were discovered in two cargo containers after a search of the vessel in the Turkish port of Ambarli, about 20 miles from Istanbul. The Maltese-flagged Breze-47, crewed by six Ukrainians, declared its cargo to be spare parts but Turkish port officials became suspicious when they noticed damage to the identification numbers inscribed on one of the shipping containers. “The cargo declared by the ship’s captain did not match what was inside the containers...we can say that the weapons are the kind that we can describe as ‘sophisticated,’” Kursad Tuzmen, the minister in charge of foreign trade and customs, said. Turkish officials unloaded the cargo, detained the crew, and searched the vessel. A senior Turkish official, speaking on condition on anonymity, said a second ship had arrived in the port shortly afterwards asking where the “armaments shipment” was for them to deliver from Ambarli to Egypt. No further information was made available on the fate of the second ship or its crew.

Egyptian officials denied having any knowledge of the shipment, but Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul later said the Egyptian government claimed to own the seized weapons last week, the Turkish Daily News reported, June 6, 2004. Turkish officials confirmed that a diplomatic solution between Turkey, Ukraine, and Egypt is expected soon.