Bombs Over Baghdad

Bombing Saddam is a worthwhile activity – any time. But we are reminded of the military adage that there is a world of difference between “getting something done” and “doing something.” The former implies a goal, a strategy of which military action is a component. The latter is simply the use of force. President Roosevelt told General Eisenhower to liberate Europe, he didn’t tell him to land in Normandy in June.

The United States has undertaken sporadic military action in Iraq since 1991. We hit an empty building in retaliation for the attempt on President Bush’s life.

Bombing Saddam is a worthwhile activity – any time. But we are reminded of the military adage that there is a world of difference between “getting something done” and “doing something.” The former implies a goal, a strategy of which military action is a component. The latter is simply the use of force. President Roosevelt told General Eisenhower to liberate Europe, he didn’t tell him to land in Normandy in June.

The United States has undertaken sporadic military action in Iraq since 1991. We hit an empty building in retaliation for the attempt on President Bush’s life. We struck antiaircraft batteries in the south as punishment for Iraqi incursions into the Kurdish safe zone in the north. We threatened and threatened to bomb if UNSCOM was not permitted to do its job. These were uses of military power unrelated to any apparent endgame, i.e., we were “doing something.”

We would ask of the current action, “What is it the President wants to have done?” And, “Is a bombing campaign of uncertain duration the best way to accomplish the goal?”

American targets appear to be military installations related to weapons of mass destruction and installations of the Republican Guard and military intelligence. Excellent choices if the goal is only to reduce Iraq’s short-term ability to threaten either American or allied assets in the region.

But without changing the leadership in Baghdad, nothing we destroy before Ramadan cannot be rebuilt and used to subjugate the Iraqi people and threaten others again in the future. That is the minimal lesson of stopping the war short in 1991. The Gulf War coalition had clearly destroyed short-term Iraqi capabilities. But by leaving the country in Saddam’s hands, and leaving Saddam with his Republican Guard, we left intact his ability to increase his WMD and missile holdings, strengthen the Guard, brutally suppress the Iraqi people, and again threaten the region.

We strongly believe the American goal must be to change the leadership.

American air power can be an important component of this. We can reduce the Army and Republican Guard, destroy command and control capabilities, and tie Saddam down in Baghdad. Air power can enforce a strict “no fly/no drive zone” in the north and south to make it possible for the opposition to organize effectively. (They claim they can under the right circumstances and we have to hope they are right.) At the same time, the US should quickly release to the Iraqi opposition the military equipment authorized by Congress and use the airwaves to help build support for toppling the regime.

Obviously, the Iraqi opposition and we may fail to dislodge Saddam. But if today’s bombs over Baghdad are unrelated to a long-term strategy to free the Iraqi people of their tyrant, it is a futile spectacle.