Iraq – Again

Iraq tosses the UNSCOM inspectors – again. Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen travels the region looking for Arab and Turkish “support” for some American policy or other – again. They reject him – again. The President waffles between threats of military action and a collapse into no action at all – again. The Administration denies that it is waffling – again. The French and the Russians push to end sanctions on Iraq – again. Saddam wins – again.

And why not?

Iraq tosses the UNSCOM inspectors – again. Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen travels the region looking for Arab and Turkish “support” for some American policy or other – again. They reject him – again. The President waffles between threats of military action and a collapse into no action at all – again. The Administration denies that it is waffling – again. The French and the Russians push to end sanctions on Iraq – again. Saddam wins – again.

And why not? After all he, not we, seems to grasp the fundamental point here: Saddam’s goal is regional hegemony, which he plans to ensure by having an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver it. He has already demonstrated his willingness to hit civilian targets (including Muslim ones) with missiles (Iranian cities during the Iran-Iraq War and Tel Aviv during the Gulf War) and chemicals (the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988). The valiant inspectors of UNSCOM have been a tremendous impediment to his plan, and their ouster is essential – at all costs.

Against this backdrop, according to published reports, the National Security Council decided last spring that it is not feasible to track down all of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons caches, and that military strikes could not force Saddam to let UNSCOM search the country unimpeded. The NSC essentially threw in the towel, leaving sanctions as the only face-saving mechanism for an administration that wanted to pretend it is “doing something” about Iraq.

President Clinton’s most recent indication that he will again avoid military action and rely on sanctions carries little cost for the regime. A terrible price is, of course, paid by certain segments of the Iraqi population, creating tension between the “hardhearted” Americans and some of our erstwhile allies. Hungry children are positively useful to the Butcher of Baghdad, as old Gulf War partners argue with each other rather than with him. In the meantime, inspections have ceased, Saddam remains in control of the country and the arsenal, and the Iraqi people suffer.

Two thoughts: First, military action may not be able to force Saddam to let UNSCOM inspectors search the country. We agree with Gen. John Sheehan, USMC (ret.) who said, “Bombing something into submission has never worked.” And an Osirak-type raid couldn’t destroy the whole arsenal in any event. But military action could destroy the sites UNSCOM had determined most likely to be dangerous, make Saddam pay in currency he values, and might undermine the confidence his Republican Guard has in him. And it might stiffen the backbone of others in the region.

Second, Congress has given the President authority to provide overt assistance – including weapons – to the Iraqi democratic opposition. The President should use it and throw the full force of American prestige in to a concerted effort to dislodge the current regime. Ultimately this is the most sure way to remove the threat of Saddam from the region and his foot from the neck of the Iraqi people.