On July 29, 2015, JINSA’s Gemunder Center Iran Task Force released a new report at a panel discussion to provide an expert analysis of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), the final agreement with Iran on nuclear disarmament.
In Vienna on July 14, the P5+1 and Iran agreed on a final deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA). This report analyzes whether the JCPA addresses the Task Force’s questions and concerns about the framework agreement.
Last month JINSA’s Gemunder Center Iran Task Force released a report detailing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program that need to be resolved to ensure an acceptable final deal. With the April 2 announcement of a framework for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), it is now important to assess whether these concerns have been addressed. This is necessary to determine which issues remain to be settled if the United States hopes to secure a deal that prevents a nuclear weapons-capable Iran.
In advance of the deadline for a framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, JINSA’s Gemunder Center Iran Task Force issues a new brief detailing concerns about Iran's nuclear program that must still be resolved to ensure an acceptable final deal. The brief also provides recommendations for the Administration and Congress to work together to develop credible verification and enforcement mechanisms for a comprehensive agreement.
In the wake of the recent four-month extension of negotiations for a comprehensive deal on Iran's nuclear program, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy held a panel discussion on July 28, 2014 to assess this outcome and discuss steps going forward for U.S. policy to prevent a nuclear Iran.
JINSA's Gemunder Center Iran Task Force issues new report on improving the prospects for an acceptable final deal with Iran. Co-Chairs: Amb. Eric Edelman and Amb. Dennis Ross
A viable diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear quest requires an agreement that verifiably limits its nuclear program to prevent it from attaining nuclear weapons capability. Iranian leaders, by all accounts, are loath to make concessions necessary to attain such a deal. Motivating them to accept such conditions should be a primary objective for the Obama Administration, which has pledged both to "use all elements of American power to prevent a nuclear Iran" and that a "bad deal is worse is than no deal." A good deal, however, still appears remote.
JINSA's Gemunder Center Iran Task Force issues new report assessing the impact of the interim deal with Iran. Co-Chairs: Amb. Eric Edelman and Amb. Dennis Ross
More than three months since the implementation of the interim deal with Iran over its nuclear program, formally known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), we thought it valuable to offer an assessment of the impact of the agreement. Evidence suggests the JPA has set back Iran’s breakout timing by nearly one month. However, that benefit is more than offset by provisions which: allow Iran to enrich uranium more rapidly than before the deal; steadily reduce the pressure on Tehran from sanctions; and fail to resolve international concerns about Iran’s weaponization activities. As a result, in our judgment the JPA is not making a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear program more likely to be achieved.
JINSA's Gemunder Center Iran Task Force issues new report assessing the interim deal with Iran. Co-Chairs: Amb. Eric Edelman and Amb. Dennis Ross
Preventing a nuclear-capable Iran remains the most pressing national security challenge facing the United States and its Middle East allies, and a permanent diplomatic settlement that fully addresses international security concerns remains the preferred means to achieve this objective. We judge this outcome to be more remote and harder to achieve now than before the P5+1 countries and Iran signed an interim deal in Geneva, known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), which went into effect January 20, 2014.
Momentum is once again building for diplomacy with Iran. In this paper, we detail the principles that should determine the content of that package and the boundaries of U.S. negotiations with Iran. Based on these principles, we agree the optimal solution - and the one that would contribute the most toward peace and stability in the region - would be a settlement only permitting Iran to retain a civilian nuclear power program but no enrichment facilities or capabilities.
We have now arrived at a critical moment in the quest to thwart Tehran's nuclear ambitions. The first report of the Iran Task Force conducted under the auspices of the Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy analyzes how.