In the wake of the recent four-month extension of negotiations for a comprehensive deal on Iran's nuclear program, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy held a panel discussion on July 28, 2014 to assess this outcome and discuss steps going forward for U.S. policy to prevent a nuclear Iran.
A viable diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear quest requires an agreement that verifiably limits its nuclear program to prevent it from attaining nuclear weapons capability. Iranian leaders, by all accounts, are loath to make concessions necessary to attain such a deal. Motivating them to accept such conditions should be a primary objective for the Obama Administration, which has pledged both to "use all elements of American power to prevent a nuclear Iran" and that a "bad deal is worse is than no deal." A good deal, however, still appears remote.
Vice Admiral Eliezer "Chiney" Marom was the Commander of the Israeli Navy from 2007-2011 and was charged with rehabilitating the Navy after the 2006 Lebanon War, in the wake of a Hezbollah missile strike on INS Hanit.
We are fewer than a dozen days from the July 20 deadline for a final deal with Iran on its illicit nuclear weapons program. The Supreme Leader, who actually runs things, had this to say on Tuesday: "Their aim is that we accept a capacity of 10,000 [separate] work units (SWUs), which is equivalent to 10,000 centrifuges of the older type that we already have. Our officials say we need 190,000 SWU. Perhaps this is not a need this year or in two years or five years, but this is the country's absolute need."