Proliferation & Missile Defense

A common thread runs among the key foreign policy issues facing the United States today. India’s nuclear explosions; Pakistan’s response; Chinese rocket launches; Russian support for Iranian nuclear and missile programs; French investment in Iranian gas production; Chinese support for Pakistan’s bomb; the continuation of sanctions on Iraq; even Israel’s security decisions on the West Bank are all issues of proliferation – chemical, biological, nuclear capabilities and the missile technology to create delivery systems.

A common thread runs among the key foreign policy issues facing the United States today. India’s nuclear explosions; Pakistan’s response; Chinese rocket launches; Russian support for Iranian nuclear and missile programs; French investment in Iranian gas production; Chinese support for Pakistan’s bomb; the continuation of sanctions on Iraq; even Israel’s security decisions on the West Bank are all issues of proliferation – chemical, biological, nuclear capabilities and the missile technology to create delivery systems. And, as the problems have a common thread, America’s response must as well.

During the 1980s, the U.S. used its muscle to make COCOM – the Western system for coordinating efforts to deny military technology to the Soviet Union and East Bloc – an effective vehicle for blocking technology transfers. It was not foolproof, but it vastly increased the expense and the difficulty for the Soviets to get and assimilate technology, leaving it farther and farther behind the West in capability. COCOM was, according to the post-Soviets, a real pain in the neck.

Today, controlling the elements of WMD and ballistic missiles is necessarily more complicated. More countries are gaining those capabilities, and their allies are not necessarily America’s allies. China, North Korea and Russia are major sellers. Western European countries will do a lot if the price is right, and the U.S. has eviscerated controls on computer technology and a range of other helpful military-related commodities. Iran, Iraq (before the sanctions), Pakistan, Syria, China and Russia are major buyers. So is India. Every country has a rationale for what it buys and sells.

The Clinton Administration expresses endless verbal concern about proliferation, notably against the buyers, not against the sellers. Under European grumbling the President elected not to implement sanctions against France’s Totale and Russia’s Gazprom for their dealings in Iran, and Russian and Chinese proliferation have been ignored because the President claims it would interfere with his foreign policy priorities. Never mind that proliferation IS the foreign policy priority of some countries. India, on the other hand, got dumped on for responding to what it believed to be an intolerable threat from China’s own capabilities and Chinese help for Pakistan.

It is highly unlikely that our allies and we will reconstruct a technology control regime to deal with today’s challenges. There will be no new COCOM for the year 2000.

While we cannot abandon the fight to slow or limit the spread of weapons-related technology, we must make full use of the technological advantages we have. Our allies, our adversaries and others must know that the United States will rapidly pursue a ballistic missile defense for the continental United States as well as our assets and allies abroad. Nothing would send a stronger or more appropriate signal about the importance the U.S. attaches to the weapons proliferation policies of other countries.

Congress has appropriated the money. It is time to marshal America’s technological resources in pursuit of the goal.